Plea Agreement In Criminal Case Analyzed Under Contract Law.

In 1991, defendant entered a plea agreement in a case charging six lewd and lascivious acts upon a child under the age of 14. He pled nolo contendere to a single count in exchange for dismissal of the other counts. The written plea form, which he signed, recited that the maximum penalties for his conviction would be probation, participation in a work furlough program, fines, testing and registration as a sex offender. In 2004, the Legislature adopted “Megan’s Law,” which provides a means by which the public can obtain the names, addresses, and photographs of the state’s registered sex offenders. Defendant filed a civil complaint in federal court asserting that requiring him to comply with the amended law’s public notification provisions would violate his plea agreement. The district court concluded that publicly disclosing any of defendant’s previously confidential sex offender registration information would violate the terms of his plea agreement. Thus, the federal trial court issued an injunction barring the California Attorney General from disclosing defendant’s information. The Attorney General appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which court directed a question to the California Supreme Court.  The California Supreme Court accepted the request and rephrased the Ninth Circuit’s question as follows: “Under California law of contract interpretation as applicable to the interpretation of plea agreements, does the law in effect at the time of a plea agreement bind the parties or can the terms of a plea agreement be affected by changes in the law?”  The California Supreme Court answered the question as follows: “We respond that the general rule in California is that the plea agreement will be ‘deemed to incorporate and contemplate not only the existing law but the reserve power of the state to amend the law or enact additional laws for the public good and in pursuance of public policy. . . .’ (People v. Gipson (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1065, 1070, [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 478] (Gipson).) That the parties enter into a plea agreement thus does not have the effect of insulating them from changes in the law that the Legislature has intended to apply to them.”  John Doe v. Kamala D. Harris, as Attorney General  (Cal. Sup. Ct.; July 1, 2013) 57 Cal.4th 64, [302 P.3d 598; 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 290].