Plaintiff brought an action for sexual assault against her employer and two co-employees. One of the co-employees cross-complained against plaintiff for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted plaintiffs motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute [Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16] and dismissed the cross-complaint, and the co-employee appealed. After concluding the allegations of the cross-complaint were within the SLAPP law, the appellate court considered whether the co-employee had nonetheless demonstrated a likelihood of prevailing on the merits. The appellate court found that the co-employee did not specifically deny the truth of the allegation he had sexually assaulted plaintiff, noting that, while the cross-complaint alleged plaintiff’s statements were false, he “cannot rely on his pleading at all, even if verified, to demonstrate a probability of success on the merits,” and that “Such a denial—which would have been easy to make under penalty of perjury, if true—cannot be reasonably inferred.” The judgment of dismissal was affirmed. Aber v. Comstock (Cal. App. First Dist., Div. 1; January 11, 2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 931.
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