Not All Venue Selection Clauses Are Contrary To Public Policy.

A wholesale food distributor with its principal place of business in San Diego contracted with a restaurant chain and entered into a “Master Foodservice Distribution Agreement” [MFDA]. The MFDA contained a venue selection clause stating “any litigation related to or arising from this Agreement may be brought in a state or federal court located within Orange County, CA and the parties consent to the jurisdiction of such court.” The distributor brought an action against the restaurant chain in San Diego and the court transferred the action to Orange County. The distributor petitioned for extraordinary relief challenging the San Diego Superior Court’s order transferring the matter to Orange County, claiming the California Supreme Court’s opinion in General Acceptance Corp. v. Robinson (1929) 207 Cal. 285, [277 P. 1039], rendered all contractual venue selection clauses void as contrary to public policy in California. The appellate court found the case was properly transferred, stating: “[W]e conclude that the General Acceptance court’s holding is that a venue selection clause that attempts to vest venue in a county that is not proper under the legislative scheme may not be given effect. We reject [the distributor’s] interpretation of General Acceptance as making a broad pronouncement regarding the validity of venue selection clauses generally; rather, the contract in that case, which attempted to set trial in a county that was improper under the legislative scheme, was void.” Battaglia Enterprises, Inc. v. Sup.Ct. (Yard House USA) (Cal.App. Fourth Dist., Div. 1; April 11, 2013) (As Mod. April 29, 2013) (Case No. D063076).