A 15-year-old boy brought a civil rights claim against the county and a sheriff’s deputy. Just prior to being shot, the 15-year-old was playing “cops and robbers” with friends while riding his bicycle and carrying a replica of a semiautomatic pistol. Two deputies spotted him, made a U-turn and approached him from behind. The deputies ordered the boy to stop, which he did. What happened next is disputed.
One shareholder sued another shareholder and a small construction firm over a dispute in the operation of the construction firm. Defendant was represented in the suit by a law firm which had been retained by the construction company in 2006 and never discharged; nor had the law firm ever withdrawn from representing the company.
In Citizens United v. FEC (2010) 558 U.S. 310 [130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753, 22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S. 73], (Citizens United), a divided United States Supreme Court invalidated federal election law restrictions on the political speech of corporations, holding that a speaker’s identity as a corporation, as opposed to natural person, could not […]
Plaintiff obtained a default judgment in January 2013. In July 2013, the trial court entered a revised judgment after defendant moved to vacate the judgment.
The general rule is that statutes, including those clarifying existing law, do not operate retrospectively. In Western Security Bank v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 232 [62 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 933 P.2d 507], the California Supreme Court held that, despite that general rule, when the Legislature promptly reacts to the emergence of a novel question of statutory interpretation by the courts, “[a]n amendment which in effect construes and clarifies a prior statute must be accepted as the legislative declaration of the meaning of the original act, where the amendment was adopted soon after the controversy arose concerning the proper interpretation of the statute.”
The Court of Appeal held: Plaintiffs sued defendants for trade secret misappropriation. The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer on the ground that plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the Taiwanese statute of limitations. On appeal, plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer because it resolved disputed issues of fact based on information from judicially noticed documents.
Years ago, the juvenile court terminated plaintiff’s parental rights to her daughter and the Court of Appeal affirmed, rejecting plaintiff’s contention of ineffective assistance of counsel by her appointed juvenile dependency lawyers. Thereafter, plaintiff filed the current action for legal malpractice against the same lawyers. The trial court granted the lawyers’ motion for summary judgment.
After a business relationship went south, plaintiff filed a complaint for damages in 2004. The prayer was for general and special damages according to proof. Default was entered in 2005. A statement of damages alleging damages for over $2 million was filed and served, and at the prove-up hearing, the trial court awarded almost that much.
We hold that [plaintiff] adequately alleged [the deputy D.A.] was liable for false imprisonment; we will also hold that statutory prosecutorial immunity [Government Code section 821.6] did not apply to the false imprisonment claim. However, the demurrer had to be sustained based on common-law prosecutorial immunity.
The underlying defendants then brought an action against the underlying plaintiffs and their lawyer for malicious prosecution, to which the present defendant, who was the underlying plaintiff, brought a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute